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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
THE NEED FOR AFFORDABLE HOUSING:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL VIABILITY OF
INCLUSIONARY ZONING
SERENA M. WILLIAMS*
INTRODUCTION

In 1991, the President's Advisory Commission on Regulatory
Barriers to Affordable Housing issued its report on the effect of federal, state, and local laws on the development of affordable housing.
The report, entitled "Not in My Back Yard": Removing Barriersto
Affordable Housing, concluded that exclusionary, discriminatory,
and unnecessary regulations constitute formidable barriers to affordable housing by raising costs twenty to thirty-five percent in
some communities. 1 For purposes of the report, the Commission
stated that a housing affordability problem exists when a household
earning 100% or less of the area's median income cannot afford to
rent or buy safe and sanitary housing in the market without spending more than thirty percent of its income. 2 The Commission proposed thirty-one recommendations for federal, state, and local
governments, and for private action.
Several of the recommendations concerned the exclusionary
nature of zoning. The Commission proposed that states undertake
an ongoing action program of regulatory-barrier removal and reform.3 The Commission further concluded that states can have a
major impact upon the availability of affordable housing by becoming active participants in setting the requirements for developmental regulations. To that end, the Commission recommended that
states initiate actions to end discrimination against certain types of
* Legal Writing Fellow, Howard University School of Law; LL.M., The
George Washington University National Law Center; J.D., Georgetown University; B.A., Smith College. This article is adapted from a thesis submitted in
completion of the LL.M. degree awarded by The George Washington University

National Law Center.
1. ADVISORY COMMISSION

ON

REGULATORY BARRIERS

HOUSING, "NOT IN My BACK YARD":

TO AFFORDABLE

REMOVING BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE

HOUSING 4 (Washington D.C., United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development, July 1991) [hereinafter NOT IN MY BACK YARD].
2. Id. at 3.
3. Id. at 14.
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affordable housing, such as manufactured housing, accessory apart4
ments, duplexes, and single-room-occupancy units.
The Commission report recommended an expansive range of
actions to attack the regulatory barriers to affordable housing. The
Commission viewed the elimination of a number of exclusionary
zoning practices that keep housing prices artificially high as one
way to achieve home ownership for millions of families. However,
one method of achieving ownership through the provision of affordable housing that the Commission discussed, but did not recommend, was inclusionary zoning programs. 5 Under inclusionary
zoning programs, a locality either mandates that a developer build a
certain percentage of lower cost homes, or agrees to relax its zoning
restrictions on density in return for a developer agreeing to provide
moderately priced units.
Inclusionary zoning programs are designed for the purpose of
including within a neighborhood residents of a particular income
group. This goal of economic inclusion contrasts with the usual goal
of zoning which is the exclusion of particular uses and thus, in effect, the exclusion of particular users. The lofty goals of inclusionary zoning programs, however, may be viewed by some as a land-use
burden imposed on only a few developers for a public good. A developer may challenge an inclusionary zoning program as the taking of his property without just compensation. Though not without
some basis, a Fifth Amendment claim should fail against a locality
that has designed and implemented a program which allows a developer to earn a profit on his development. The recent Supreme
Court decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council6 may
bolster the developer's claim, but the decision should not cause it to
succeed.
This article examines the viability of inclusionary zoning. Part
I of this article provides a historical analysis of the exclusionary nature of zoning. Inclusionary zoning programs are a direct response
to exclusionary zoning practices, such as zoning with a preference
for single-family dwellings and for large lots which have the effect
of economic segregation. Part II discusses inclusionary housing
concepts. As part of the broader concept of inclusionary housing
practices, Part II gives an overview of cases where courts have mandated regional fair-share requirements for the provision of affordable housing.
Part II also provides a concrete example of
inclusionary zoning by dicussing a program that Montgomery
County, Maryland has implemented. Part III concludes with an
analysis of the takings issue and United States Supreme Court pre4. Id. at 15-16.
5. Id. at 2-7 to 2-8.

6. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
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cedent and presents ways in which an inclusionary zoning program
can meet a constitutional takings challenge.
I.

THE EXCLUSIONARY NATURE OF ZONING

Zoning as a measure designed to facilitate land development
patterns is, by its very nature, exclusionary. Zoning separates incompatible uses, that is, it excludes uses considered inappropriate
for that area. For example, zoning ordinances tend to exclude commercial and industrial uses from residential areas. Zoning, acceptable in the above situations, becomes controversial when it excludes
low- and moderate-income residents from affordable housing,
whether intentional or unintentional.
A.

The Euclid Legacy

Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., the case that established
the nature of zoning as an exclusionary tool, ushered in the modern
era of land-use law. 7 Euclid began an era where the concept of zoning was accepted as a means of land planning. Many, however, now
question the philosophy that the essence of zoning should be strict
segregation of uses with protection of single-family dwellings as the
highest purpose. One commentator goes so far as to say that in Euclid the Supreme Court sanctioned "a public mechanism for promoting and stabilizing private development, reducing risk in
property investment, and protecting the character and quality of
' '8
single-family residential neighborhoods.
In Euclid, a village adopted an ordinance "establishing a comprehensive zoning plan for regulating and restricting the location of
trades, industries, apartment houses, two-family houses, single-family houses, etc., the lot area to be built upon, and the size and height
of buildings."9 Ambler Realty Company owned a tract of land containing sixty-eight acres. Under the ordinance, landowners could
not use the first 620 feet of the land for apartment houses, hotels, or
other public buildings. 10 The next 130 feet excluded industries, the7. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding
exclusionary zoning as a valid exercise of state power not violative of the
constitution).
8. Yale Rabin, Expulsive Zoning: The Inequitable Legacy of Euclid, in
ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM: PROMISES STILL TO KEEP 101 (Charles M.
Haar & Jerold S. Kayden eds., 1990). Rabin contends that exclusion to preserve or enhance value is the essence of zoning. Id. He further states that
"[t]he acceptance of zoning as a regulatory restriction on the rights of private
property became a reality only after its potential for enforcing separation and
protecting established privilege was understood and approved." Id. at 103. Rabin's analysis of racial separation as a "recurrent theme" in zoning could
equally apply to separation by economic status. Id.
9. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 379-380.
10. Id. at 382.
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aters, banks, and shops." Ambler Realty attacked the ordinance on
the grounds that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment by depriv12
ing it of property without Due Process of Law.
In upholding the ordinance, the Supreme Court looked to
whether there is a "rational relation" between excluding business
and trade buildings from residential areas and the health and safety
of the community. 13 The ordinance excluded apartment houses
from residential districts because they were included in the category of business or trade. By allowing the exclusion of apartment
houses from residential districts, the Supreme Court in 1926 upheld
a regulatory barrier leading to the lack of affordable housing in
1992.
The Supreme Court in Euclid was open in its bias against
multi-family housing. The Court singled out apartment buildings
when discussing reports concurring in the view that communities
should segregate business and industrial buildings from residential
areas. The Supreme Court accepted reports pointing out the drawbacks of multi-family dwellings:
[T]he development of detached house sections is greatly retarded by
the coming of apartment houses, which has sometimes resulted in destroying the entire section for private house purposes; that in such sections very often the apartment house is a mere parasite, constructed in
order to take advantage of the open spaces and attractive surroundings
created by the residential character of the district. Moreover, the coming of one apartment house is followed by others... and bringing, as
their necessary accompaniments, the disturbing noises incident to increased traffic and business, and the occupation, by means of moving
and parked automobiles, of larger portions of the streets, thus detracting from their safety and depriving children of the privilege of
quiet and open spaces for play, enjoyed by those in more favored localities, - until, finally, the residential character of the neighborhood and
its desirability as a place of detached residences are utterly destroyed.
Under these circumstances, apartment houses, which in a different environment would be not only entirely unobjectionable
but highly desir4
able, come very near to being nuisances.1
Euclid established zoning as an appropriate use of the police
powers that states could delegate to local governments. However,
in promoting the general welfare and the health and safety of the
community, the Supreme Court in reality promoted the detached
single-family home as preferable to multi-family dwellings. The
Court's bias against such dwellings and those who inhabit them was
apparent. Zoning for single-family neighborhoods would preserve a
more favorable environment in which to rear children, would in11.
12.
13.
14.

Id.
Id. at 384.
Id. at 391.
Euclid, 272 U.S. 365, 394-395 (1926).
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crease the safety and security of home life, and even decrease noise
and other conditions which produce or intensify nervous disorders. 15 Euclid introduced the use of zoning restrictions as regulatory barriers to affordable housing.
B.

Zoning for Economic Segregation

Nearly thirty-six years after the decision in Euclid, Justice Hall
of the New Jersey Supreme Court, dissenting in Vickers v. Township Committee of Gloucester Township,1 6 recognized that communities can use zoning as a tool to effect economic segregation. In
Vickers, the majority rendered an opinion holding that the township had the authority to enact a zoning ordinance amendment precluding trailer camps and parks from an industrial district. Thus,
the court indirectly upheld the exclusion of low- and moderate-income residents from the township; residents who are most likely to
purchase trailer homes. Recognizing that communities could properly use zoning to exclude factories from residential zones to preserve property values, Justice Hall refused to acknowledge as
legitimate a municipalities use of the zoning power to control the
residents of an area. 17 He wrote that the legitimate use of the zoning power does not "encompass provisions designed to let in as new
residents only certain kinds of people, or those who can afford to
live in favored kinds of housing, or to keep down tax bills of present
property owners. 1 8s Not knowing that he was commenting on the
future crisis in affordable housing, Justice Hall went on to state:
"What restrictions like minimum house size requirements, overly
large lot area regulations, and complete limitation of dwellings to
single family units really do is bring about community-wide eco19
nomic segregation."
The New Jersey courts would revisit the issue of using zoning
as an economic exclusionary measure in the Mount Laurel cases,
culminating in 1983 with the mandate that municipalities must utilize their land-use regulations to provide for their fair-share of the
region's affordable housing.20 The concept of regional fair-share
15. Id.
16. Vickers v. Township Comm. of Glouster Township, 181 A.2d 129 (N.J.
1962) (Hall, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 147. The "trailer homes" in Vickers have evolved into "manufactured housing." Id. Despite the fact that the construction of manufactured
housing is covered by a federal building code, the National Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act, see 42 U.S.C. § 5401 (1988), some
localities limit its use through zoning or building codes, or relegate it to undesirable outlying areas. NOT IN My BACK YARD, supra note 1, at 7-12.
18. Vickers, 181 A.2d at 147.
19. Id.
20. Southbern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel,
336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975) (Mount Laurel I); Southern Burlington County
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used in the Mount Laurel cases challenged the idea of the majority
opinion in Vickers which stated that "it cannot be said that every
municipality must provide for every use somewhere within its
2
borders." 1
Because exclusionary zoning is defined to protect the singlefamily residential district, localities are faced with the problem of
how to define "single-family." Many areas designed zoning ordinances to exclude non-traditional living arrangements from the single-family zone. In 1974, the United States Supreme Court in
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,22 upheld a zoning ordinance that
restricted land use to one-family dwellings and excluded lodging
houses, boarding houses, fraternity houses, or multiple dwelling
houses. The Court defined "family" as
[o]ne or more persons related by blood, adoption or marriage, living
and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit, exclusive of household servants. A number of persons but not exceeding two (2) living
and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit though not related
by blood,
adoption, or marriage shall be deemed to constitute a
23
family.
The owners of a house who rented it to six students at a nearby
university brought an action under section 1983 of title 42 of the
United States Code for an injunction declaring the ordinance unconstitutional. The Supreme Court upheld the ordinance.
As in Euclid, the majority looked at the problems presented by
multi-family dwellings: "The regimes of boarding houses, fraternity houses, and the like present urban problems. More people occupy a given space; more cars rather continuously pass by; more
cars are parked; noise travels with crowds. '24 Not content with that
analysis, the majority showed its bias against multi-family dwellings and their inhabitants:
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles are
restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land use project addressed to
family needs. This goal is a permissible one ....The police power is
not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is
ample to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the
blessings
of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for
25
people.
Again, a court indirectly upheld economic segregation and limited
affordable housing.
NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983) (Mount Laurel
II).
21. Vickers, 181 A.2d at 134 (quoting Fanale v. Borough of Hasbrouck
Heights, 139 A.2d 749, 752 (1958)).
22. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
23. Id. at 2 (quoting the definition of "family" used in the ordinance).
24. Id. at 9.
25. Id.
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In 1977, the Supreme Court was faced with another "singlefamily" case. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland,26 the Court reviewed a city housing ordinance which limited occupancy of a
dwelling unit to members of a single family. The ordinance contained an unusual and complex definition of "family" that included
only a few categories of related individuals. 2 7 The Court, in a plurality opinion overturning the ordinance, distinguished Belle Terre
by noting that the earlier case affected only unrelated individuals
while the East Cleveland ordinance forbade the living together of
certain categories of relatives. 28 The city sought to justify the ordinance as a "means of preventing overcrowding, minimizing traffic
and parking congestion, and avoiding an undue financial burden on
East Cleveland's school system. '29 The court found that "although
these are legitimate goals," the ordinance served those goals "mar'30
ginally, at best."
Families sharing a dwelling space is one way of increasing the
supply of affordable housing. However, the Supreme Court in overturning the ordinance expressed neither concern for the supply of
affordable housing nor concern for economic segregation. The
overriding factor in overturning the city's ordinance was the
Court's recognition "that freedom of personal choice in matters of
family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."3' Nevertheless, in a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, did
give some recognition to the need for affordable housing:
The "extended family"

. . .

remains not merely still a pervasive living

pattern, but under the goad of brutal economic necessity, a prominent
pattern - virtually a means of survival - for large numbers of the poor
and deprived minorities of our society. For them compelled32pooling of
scant resources requires compelled sharing of a household.
The Supreme Court visited another form of exclusionary zoning in City of Cleburne v. Ceburne Living Center.33 In Cleburne,
the proposed operator of a group home for the mentally retarded
brought suit challenging the validity of a zoning ordinance excluding such group homes from the permitted uses in a particular zoning district. The Court framed the issue as whether the city could
require a special use permit for this type facility when it freely per26. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
27. Id. at 496.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 499-500.
30. Id. at 500.
31. Moore, 431 U.S. at 499 (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414
U.S. 632 (1974)).
32. Id. at 508.
33. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
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mitted other care and multiple-dwelling facilities (including apartment buildings and boarding and lodging houses).3 4 The Court
found the ordinance invalid because the record revealed no rational
basis showing that the home would pose a special threat to the city's
legitimate interests.35 Interestingly, the Court held that negative
attitudes and "vague unsubstantiated fears" were not permissible
bases for treating a home for the mentally retarded differently
from other multiple-dwelling facilities. 36 However, residents of single-family homes and the Court itself expressed negative attitudes
against residents of the multiple-dwelling facilities which appeared
37
to be the basis for excluding apartments in the Euclid decision.
As one commentator noted, exclusionary zoning regulations
are not without benefits for some segments of society. "Those who
can afford the benefits enjoy large homes on large lots, quiet
streets, uncluttered by old cars, and long drives to work or shopping."3 8 However, exclusionary zoning ordinances can have a major
impact on residential land costs, especially in preferred suburban
locations. For example, the report from the Advisory Commission
cited recent studies on the cost impacts of zoning patterns in suburban Washington, D.C. The report shows that restrictive ordinances
add about ten percent to the price of a home beyond what is necessary to ensure health, safety, and welfare.3 9 As the Commission
recommended, removing barriers to certain types of affordable
housing options, such as manufactured housing, single-room-occupancy units, accessory apartments, and duplex and triplex housing
is one way to achieve more affordable housing. Another way is to
implement inclusionary housing programs.
II.

INCLUSIONARY HOUSING CONCEPTS

In July of 1991, the usually conservative New Hampshire
Supreme Court unanimously ruled that a town must rewrite its residential zoning ordinance to consider the housing needs of the entire region and to allow construction of more apartments. 40 The
court in Britton v. Town of Chester looked to Euclid for the possi34. Id. at 447.
35. Id. at 450.

36. Id. at 448-449.
37. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
38. Katherine Devers & J. Gardner West, Exclusionary Zoning and Its Ef
fect on Housing Opportunitiesfor the Homeless, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L., ETHICS
AND PUB. POL'Y 349, 354 (1989).
39. NOT IN My BACK YARD, supra note 1, at 205 (citing Henry Pollakowski

& Susan Wachter, The Fffects of Land-Use Constraints on Housing Prices,66
LAND ECON. 315-24 (Aug. 1990)).
40. Britton v. Town of Chester, 595 A.2d 492 (N.H. 1991) (holding the Town
of Chester's zoning ordinance unconstitutional and invalid).
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bility that a municipality might be obligated to consider the needs
of the region outside its boundaries. The court quoted the Supreme
Court in Euclid when it recognized "the possibility of cases where
the general public interest would so far outweigh the interest of the
municipality that the municipality would not be allowed to stand in
the way."' 41 This case presents one solution to the affordable housing crisis-court compulsion of local communities to accept their
fair-share of moderately-priced housing.
Some local governments, however, have not waited for courts
to mandate that they accept a regional fair-share of affordable housing. The local municipalities have taken the initiative themselves
to increase the supply of housing affordable to moderate- and lowincome residents. For example, Montgomery County, Maryland,
has designed an inclusionary housing program requiring developers
of new housing to provide a certain number of units for moderateand low-income families. This inclusionary zoning program awards
density bonuses to developers who build the affordable units. Both
the fair-share concept and inclusionary zoning can be considered inclusionary housing programs with the goal of providing affordable
housing to a particular segment of the locality's population. This
promotes economic inclusion, not exclusion.
A.

Court-MandatedRegional Fair-ShareRequirements

The New Hampshire Supreme Court in Britton v. Town of
Chester was not carving out any novel legal concept when it required the town to accept its fair-share of the region's affordable
housing needs. The New Hampshire decision cited the two Mount
Laurel cases in determining that the builder was entitled to build a
multi-family housing development. The two cases were decided
eight years apart by the New Jersey Supreme Court and established
the idea that a municipality should accept its fair-share of the re42
gional need for low- and moderate-income housing.
Mount Laurel is a township in South Jersey, not more than ten
miles from the Benjamin Franklin Bridge crossing the river to Philadelphia. At the time of the decision, almost 10,000 acres of the
14,000-acre township were zoned for residential districts
"permitt[ing] only single-family, detached dwellings, one house per
lot."' 43
The general ordinance prohibited attached townhouses,
44
apartments and mobile homes within the township limits.
41. Id. at 495 (quoting Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 390
(1926)).
42. Mount Laurel 1, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975); Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d 390
(N.J. 1983).
43. Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d 713, 719 (N.J. 1975).
44. Id.
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The case was brought by the NAACP on behalf of a group of
Black and Hispanic poor families seeking housing in Mount Laurel.
The Court framed the following question of law:
[W]hether a developing municipality like Mount Laurel may validly,
by a system of land use regulation, make it physically and economically
impossible to provide low and moderate income housing in the municipality for the various categories of persons who need and want it and
thereby, as Mount Laurel has, exclude such people from living within
its confines
because of the limited extent of their income and
45
resources.

The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the municipality's zoning
ordinance violated the general welfare provision of its State Constitution by not affording a realistic opportunity for the construction
of its fair-share of the present and prospective regional need for
46
low- and moderate-income housing.
The court revisited Mount Laurel in 1983 because of the recognition that Mount Laurel I had not resulted in realistic housing op-7
'4
portunities, but in "paper, process, witnesses, trials and appeals.
The court noted that the "builder's remedy," which effectively
grants a building permit to a plaintiff-developer based on the development proposal, as long as other local regulations are followed,
should be made more readily available to insure that low- and mod48
erate-income housing is actually built.

Like the Township of Mount Laurel, the Town of Chester, New
Hampshire, had a zoning ordinance that excluded multi-family
housing from all five zoning districts. The ordinance provided for
single-family homes on two-acre lots and duplex homes on threeacre lots. 49 The town subsequently amended the ordinance to per-

mit "multi-family housing as part of a 'planned residential development' (PRD)."5 0 However, "due to existing home construction and
environmental consideration... only slightly more than half of the
land in the two ... districts zoned for PRDs could reasonably be
used for multi-family development;" this constituted less than two
percent of the land in the town.51 Moreover, the ordinance imposed
several subjective requirements and restrictions on a developer of a
PRD, including review by a registered professional engineer before
the planning board, but paid for by the developer, and the submis52
sion of a blank check to the board with the proposal.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 724.
Id. at 724-25.
Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d 390, 410 (1983).
Id. at 452-53.
Britton v. Town of Chester, 595 A.2d 492, 494 (1991).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 494-95.
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The New Hampshire Supreme Court found that the regulations of a municipality should promote the general welfare of the
"community in which it is located and which it forms a part. '53 The
Chester Zoning Ordinance did not provide for the lawful needs of
the community.54 The court awarded the "builder's remedy" but
did not apply the Mount Laurel I analysis to determine whether to
grant such a remedy. The court allowed the builder to construct his
development if he could prove that the development provides "a realistic opportunity for the construction of low and moderate-income
'55
people."
The Town of Chester should not have been surprised at the decision by the New Hampshire Supreme Court. Citing its previous
decision in Beck v. Town of Raymond, the court reminded the Town
that it had once before held that growth control regulations cannot
be applied to exclude outsiders, "especially outsiders of any disadvantaged social or economic group. '56 The decision in Britton was
merely the logical extension of that earlier decision.
The Town of Chester is not unique in its failure to zone for
multi-family dwellings. It is not alone in its willingness to "build a
moat" around itself and lower the "drawbridge" "only for people
who can afford a single-family home on a two-acre lot or a duplex
on a three-acre lot."'57 In the Washington, D.C. suburbs, the three
largest "close-in jurisdictions with buildable land each restrict
apartment construction to about 2 percent or less of the developable
land."5 8s Exclusionary zoning patterns appear pervasive. Mandating a regional fair-share of affordable housing is one way of providing low- and moderate-income housing. According to one recent
press report, "the Mount Laurel decisions have led to the construction of about 22,000 affordable housing units in New Jersey." 59
However, other state courts may be more reluctant to order the
construction of low-cost homes to alleviate the affordable housing
shortage on the basis of their state constitutions. By relying on the
courts, regions could leave affordable housing needs unmet.
B.

Inclusionary Zoning: The Montgomery County Initiative

Inclusionary zoning is an idea that also can mandate the construction of affordable housing. An inclusionary program uses
53. Id. at 496.
54. Britton, 595 A.2d at 496.

55. Id. at 497-498.
56. Id. at 495 (citing Beck v. Town of Raymond, 394 A.2d 847

(1978)).

57. Id. at 495.
58. Kirstin Downey, Advocates See A Way to Achieve More Low-Cost Housing: Mandate It, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 1991, at A12, col. 2.

59. Id.
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novel land control methods to provide homes for low- and moderate-income residents. Incentive systems, deed restrictions, and even
unique funding plans are part of a program to require developers to
build affordable housing. Montgomery County, Maryland, has developed a prototype inclusionary zoning program.
Montgomery County, Maryland, is one of the nation's most affluent counties. In 1973, to address the problem of affordable housing, the County Council enacted the Moderately Priced Dwelling
Unit ("MPDU") Ordinance. The Council found that a severe housing problem existed within the county with respect to housing for
low- and moderate-income residents. 60 The Council made twelve
legislative findings concerning the affordable housing problem.
Among the findings was a statement that public policies, which permit exclusively high-priced housing developments, discriminate
against young families, elderly persons, single adults, female heads
of households, and minority households. Such policies produce the
undesirable effects of exclusionary zoning.6 1 The County Council
made it the public policy of the county to provide for a full range of
62
housing choices and for low- and moderate-income housing.
The basis of the MPDU program is to require all subdivisions of
fifty or more dwellings to include a minimum number of moderately-priced dwelling units ("MPDUs"). The developer would be
awarded a density bonus to have a reasonable prospect of realizing a
profit on such units.63 The idea behind the "density bonus" is that
the higher density that is not absorbed by the moderately-priced
units becomes a bonus to the developer, thus, ensuring that the developer incur no loss or penalty as a result of constructing MPDUs.
Under current regulations, between twelve and one-half and fifteen
percent of the houses in new subdivisions of fifty or more units
must be MPDUs. The required number of MPDUs varies according
to the amount by which the approved development exceeds the normal or standard density for the zone in which it is located.6 4 The
builder agrees to construct the MPDUs along with or before the
conventional units. Every MPDU must be offered for sale or rental
to a good faith purchaser or renter.6 5 Alternatively, the Housing
Opportunities Commission has the option to buy or lease for its own
programs, up to forty percent of all MPDUs which are not sold or
66
rented under any other federal, state, or local program.
60.

MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
Id.
Ch.
Ch.
Ch.
Ch.

25A-2.
25A-5.
25A-8(a)(a).
25A-8(b)(1).

ch. 25A-1(1988).
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The County Executive sets sales and rental prices of MPDUs.
Under the present sales price limits, a three-bedroom townhouse
has a base sales price of approximately $65,000.67 The present
rental limit of a two-bedroom garden apartment is $580.68 The sales
prices and rental limits are reviewed annually and are revised to
reflect changes in construction costs.
The County closely screens prospective buyers of MPDUs. A
person seeking to rent or purchase a MPDU must apply to the
County Department of Housing and Community Development for
69
placement on the eligibility list maintained by the Department.
All of the houses for sale are sold through a lottery system to insure
that all applicants have an equal chance of purchasing a MPDU.
The income limits of people who may be placed on the eligibility list
are established by the County and are subject to periodic revision.
70
Present maximum income limits are as follows:
Household Size
Maximum Permitted Moderate Income
1
$26,000
2
$34,500
3
$36,500
4
$38,500
5
$39,900
The applicant must verify that the household meets the income
requirements for the MPDU program.
The ordinances places restrictions on the purchasers or renters
of MPDUs to insure that the houses are available and affordable to
future owners. First, owners of MPDUs are not permitted to lease
their units to other parties unless the owner can demonstrate
sufficient cause to have this restriction waived. 71 Second, the resale
price of the MPDU will be controlled for a ten-year period. The
owner may resell the unit during the control period; however, the
resale price will be limited. Generally, the MPDU allows a price
equal to the original price plus the increase in inflation from the
date of the original purchase to the date of resale, plus the fair
market value of any capital improvements made to the unit.72 For
the first sixty days, the unit must be offered to a person of eligible
income and to the Housing Opportunities Commission. After the
67. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD.,
Application Form (Jan. 1986).

MODERATELY PRICED HOUSING PROGRAM,

68. Id.
69. ExEc. REG. No. 151-85, § 4A (County Executive, Montgomery County,

MD., Apr. 17, 1986).
70. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., MODERATELY PRICED HOUSING PROGRAM,

Application Form (Jan. 1986).
71. ExEc. REG. No. 151-85, § 4D (County Executive, Montgomery County,
MD., Apr. 17, 1986).
72. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., MODERATELY PRICED HOUSING PROGRAM,

Application Form (Jan. 1986).
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sixty-day period expires, that unit may be offered for sale to the
public.

73

Montgomery County's plan has led to the sale or rental of over
8,000 units. 74 Most of the single-family homes are clustered
townhouses. Units in multi-family projects are usually distributed
throughout the development. However, the program has not
satisfied the County's need for cheaper housing. In fact, according
to officials, the United States is in need of another 25,000 affordable
75
housing units today.
III.

THE TAKINGS CHALLENGE

Inclusionary zoning used as a remedy for exclusionary practices
or as a solution to the affordable housing crisis presents the legal
issue of whether the inclusionary zoning program is an unconstitutional taking of private property for public use without just compensation. A developer might argue that by forcing him to dedicate
a portion of his property to solve a public social problem, the local
or state government has effectivelly taken his property without just
compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Although a developer
may have a basis for a constitutional takings argument, an inclusionary zoning program can be designed to avoid a takings challenge.
With the Supreme Court's present emphasis in regulatory takings
challenges on the economic impact of the regulation and the economic viability of the owner's land, programs must ensure developers a reasonable return on their investments to survive a Fifth
Amendment claim.
A.

The Penn Central Test

Before 1987, a discussion of the takings issue would have centered on two state cases and on the Supreme Court decision in Penn
Central TransportationCo. v. City of New York. 76 Two state courts
analyzed the takings issue with regard to municipal inclusionary
zoning programs, and reached different results. In Board of Supervisors v. DeGroff Enterprises,77 the Virginia Supreme Court not
only found the Fairfax County inclusionary zoning program to be
beyond the authority of the local government, but also held the requirement to be a taking. However, in Uxbridge Ass'n v. Township
73. EXEC. REG. No. 151-85, § 4C (County Executive, Montgomery County,
MD., Apr. 17, 1986).
74. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., MODERATELY PRICED HOUSING PROGRAM,

Application Form (Jan. 1986).
75. Downey, supra note 58, at A12.
76. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
77. Board of Supervisors v. DeGroff Enter., 198 S.E.2d 600 (Va. 1973).
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of Cherry Hill,78 a New Jersey trial court rejected the takings claim
of the developer, emphasizing that the developer had never applied
for federal housing subsidies to cushion its financial loss on the inclusionary units, and thus, the developer was responsible for much
of its own hardship.
On the matter of regulatory takings the Supreme Court set out
a balancing test for determining whether a taking had occurred.
The Court in Penn Central laid out three factors to consider for the
balancing test: 1) the economic impact of the government regulation on the landowner; 2) the extent to which the regulation interferes with investment-backed expectations of the landowner; and,
3) the character of the government action. 79 The Court suggested
that these various factors should be weighted on a case-by-case
80
basis.
Under the first and second factors, the owner must show that
the regulation makes the property almost valueless. If the landowner can still earn any type of reasonable return on his property,
then the fact that the developer could earn substantially more
money is irrelevant.8 1 Under a test like this, an inclusionary program such as the one implemented by Montgomery County should
likely withstand the takings test. The program awards density bonuses in exchange for building the MPDUs, enabling the builder to
have reasonable prospects of realizing a profit on the units. Furthermore, the program provides for review and revision of the sales
prices and rental limits annually to reflect changes in construction
costs. Such safeguards would meet the Penn Central test which implied that the property owner must suffer almost a total loss of economic value to establish a taking. Developers under Montgomery
County's program are unlikely to show no return on their
investment.
Courts apply the third factor, the character of the government
action, to determine whether the government "physically invaded
the claimant's tangible property. ' 8 2 The Court is more likely to
find a taking when there is a physical intrusion, stating, "[a] 'taking'
may more readily be found when the interference with property
78. Uxbridge Ass'n v. Township of Cherry Hill, No. L47571-77 (N.J. Sup. Ct.
Mar. 17, 1980).
79. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
80. Id. However, two years later in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255
(1980), the Court created a two-part test for determining a taking. A taking
occurs if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests
or denies an owner economically viable use of his land. Id. at 260. It did cite
Penn Central in support of the second factor, but did not discuss how the twopart test differs from the three-factor test in Penn Central. Id.
81. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-131.
82. Andre Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Princples, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1301, 1317 (1989).
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can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than
when interference arises from some public program adjusting the
benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common
good."'8 3 In subsequent cases using this factor, however, the Court
has focused on the serious nature of government's action and then
on the government's justification for its action. The Court shifted
its inquiry from "whether the government had imposed a serious
loss on the claimant" to "whether the government's actions were
justified. '8 4 As will be discussed below, the inclusionary zoning
program could be justified as furthering the legitimate state interest of providing affordable housing.
The Penn Central Court also refused to accept the landowner's
contention that a unique burden on a particular landowner was
enough to constitute a taking. The majority stated that "legislation
designed to promote the general welfare commonly burdens some
more than others. 85 A developer in Montgomery County should
also lose that argument. The inclusionary zoning requirement applies to all developers constructing projects of fifty or more units.
The burden would not be unique to one particular landowner.
B.

The Nollan Means/End Test

In 1987, the Supreme Court rendered three land-use opinions
with significant repercussions for the regulatory taking analysis set
forth in Penn Central and other cases. The cases were Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,86 FirstEnglish Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,8 7 and Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.8 8 One commentator summarized the
three decisions as follows:
FirstEnglish held that the U.S. Constitution requires an award of damages as compensation for a regulatory taking. Nollan invalidated as an
unconstitutional taking a condition imposed on a development by the
Commission that failed to demonstrate a "nexus" between a substantial state interest, the condition imposed, and impacts caused by the
development. Finally, in the Keystone decision, the Court affirmed
that all or substantially all of the value of the entire parcel must be
83. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
84. Peterson, supra note 82, at 1319.
85. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 133.
86. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987)
(holding that the petitioners failed to show that the relevant statutory provisions constituted a taking of private property without compensation).
87. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304 (1987) (permitting a landowner to recover damages for the period
prior to the determination that a land-use regulation resulted in a taking).
88. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (imposing an
easement as a condition for the grant of a development constituted a taking
because the easement failed to substantially advance legitimate state interests).
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"taken" by a regulation before a taking will be found.8 9

The Nollan nexus requirement could present a challenge to inclusionary zoning programs since it appears to tighten the nexus requirement of Penn Central.
James and Marilyn Nollan leased beachfront property in Ventura, California with an option to buy, where there were public
beach areas located to both the north and the south. 90 A small bungalow was located on the lot, which the Nollans rented out until it
fell into disrepair. 91 In order to exercise their option to purchase,
the Nollans were required to demolish and replace the bungalow.
This, however, was dependent on their acquisition of a coastal development permit from the California Coastal Commission. 92 The
Commission eventually granted the permit subject to the condition
that they allow the public an easement to pass across a portion of
their property. 9 3 The Nollans filed a petition for a writ of administrative mandamus with the superior court. The court granted the
94
writ and struck the permit condition.
The Commission appealed to the California Court of Appeals.
The Nollans then tore down the bungalow and built a new house,
thereby satisfying the condition on their option to purchase the
property while the appeal was pending.
The Nollans then
purchased the property without informing the Commission.95 The
Court of Appeals ruled against the Nollans, thereby reversing the
superior court. 96 The Nollans appealed to the United States
Supreme Court, raising the takings issue.
The Supreme Court found that the Commission's requirement
for the grant of an easement as a condition of receiving a building
permit was an uncompensated taking. In the decision, Justice
Scalia set out the traditional takings test at the beginning of the
decision: "We have long recognized that land use regulation does
not effect a taking if it 'substantially advance[s] legitimate state interest' and does not 'den[y] an owner economically viable use of his
land.' 97 He further stated that Supreme Court cases "have not
elaborated on the standards for determining what constitutes a 'legitimate state interest' or what type of connection between the reg89. Richard J. Roddewig, Recent Developments in Land Use Planningand
Zoning, 21 URB. LAw. 769, 770 (1989).
90. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 828.
93. Id. at 827-28.
94. Id. at 829.
95. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 830.
96. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 223 Cal. Rptr. 28 (2d Dist. 1986).
97. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987) (citing
Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
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ulation and the state interest satisfies the requirement that the
regulation 'substantially advance' that state interest." 98 Obviously,
the Nollan case would elaborate on one of those two prongs.
Rather than focusing on the economic impact of the government action, as the Court usually did, Scalia focused on the "substantially advances the legitimate state interest" prong.
Commentators have interpreted Scalia's third footnote as arguing
that the adverb "substantially" was an important element in the
standard of review. 99 The Supreme Court found a taking because
the permit condition failed to "substantially advance" the state interest which was the justification of the prohibition to build on the
coast in the first place. In other words, "the lack of nexus between
the condition and the original purpose of the building restriction
converts that purpose to something other than what it was."' °° The
regulation failed to substantially advance any legitimate state
interest.
In looking for a nexus, the Court might have upheld the requirement if the condition had been related to the public need or
burden created by the Nollans' new house. 1 1 One could thus read
Nollan as saying that the regulation was a taking "because it was
not directed toward a 'social evil' caused by the Nollans' proposed
use of their property.' 10 2 The Court may have been suggesting a
heightened cause and effect scrutiny under the Fifth Amendment
such that a "property owner may not be singled out to bear the cost
of a regulation unless the Court finds that the owner's use of her
property caused the problem that the regulation seeks to
1 03
address."'
The Supreme Court's decision in Nollan raised problems for
the traditional takings analysis and indicated an instability in the
area. Nollan appeared to shift the focus of the analysis from diminution of value to the determination of what is a legitimate state
interest and how close is the relationship between the regulation
and that interest. However, by scrutinizing the government conditions even more closely, the Court may be substituting its judgment
of what is a public good for that of the state. "A judiciary willing to
set aside such judgments effects a direct reduction in the ability of
the people's elected representatives to exercise discretion in gov98. Id.
99. Note, Taking a Step Back: A Reconsideration of the Takings Test of
Nollan v. CaliforniaCoastal Commission, 102 HARV. L. REV. 448, 450 (1988)
(citing Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834-35 n.3 (1987)).
100. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
101. Note, Taking a Step Back, supra note 99, at 451.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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erning.' 'x0 4 Possibly the "Nollan majority faulted only the state's
judgment concerning the effectiveness of the remedy chosen by"
the state.'0 5 However, its heightened scrutiny of regulations without more specific guidelines could pressure governments into acting
more slowly to implement social policy through regulations. Government officials must guess whether the state interest behind
their regulations is "legitimate" enough to withstand court scrutiny
and whether the connection of the remedy to that state interest is
close enough for the court's concern.
On the other hand, one commentator noted that the Court
"suggested that no taking is likely to occur if the government is
seeking to promote the common good."'10 6 The Court asserted that
it is less likely to find a taking when the challenged governmental
action "arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and
burdens of economic life to promote the common good."'10 7 However, the government was acting to promote the common good
when it sought to condition the Nollans' permit on providing a public beach-access easement, yet the Supreme Court found a taking.
Obviously, simply asking whether the government was acting to
promote the common good was not enough, as shown by the decision in Lucas.
C. The Lucas Emphasis on Economic Impact
On June 30, 1992, when much of the legal community was focused anxiously on the Supreme Court's decision in the abortion
rights case, the Court handed down a decision in a takings case that
had been expected to expand the rights of property owners in Fifth
Amendment cases to give them a greater chance of receiving compensation when government regulations reduce the value of the
land. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,0 8 while the
Court did not overturn its previous decisions on regulatory takings,
it did appear to shift the emphasis in takings cases to the impact of
the regulation on the economic viability of the land.
Like the Nollan case, Lucas involved the development of
coastal property. In 1986, David Lucas purchased two lots on the
Isle of Palms in Charleston County, South Carolina, for $975,000,
where he intended to build beachfront homes.' 0 9 Two years later,
104. Randall T. Shepard, Land Use Regulations in the Rehnquist Court. The
Fifth Amendment and Judicial Intervention, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 847, 864
(1989).
105. Id. at 865.
106. Peterson, supra note 82, at 1357.
107. Id. (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978)).
108. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2888 (1992).
109. Id. at 2889.
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the South Carolina state legislature passed the Beachfront Management Act, 110 which effectively prohibited Lucas from constructing
any permanent structure on his two lots.1 1' The Supreme Court
noted, in its statement of the facts, that Lucas along with others had
begun extensive residential development of the Isle of Palms, a barrier island, in the late 1970's when a 1977 South Carolina Coastal
Zone Management Act was in effect. 112 Under that Act, owners of
coastal land in designated "critical areas" had to obtain a permit
from the South Carolina Coastal Council before using the land in a
manner other than what was in use on September 28, 1977. The
Court pointed out that Lucas's lots were not in a "critical area," and
thus, not subject to the permit requirement. 11 3 This last fact, not
even mentioned in the state supreme court's decision, could weigh
significantly in the final disposition of this case on remand under
the United States Supreme Court's final holding.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the application
and enforcement of the 1988 Beachfront Management Act to prohibit development on Lucas's beachfront property was not a regulatory taking of property without just compensation. 114 The court's
decision focused on the purposes of the government regulation, par115
ticularly the purpose of preventing serious public harm.
Because Lucas did not contest the legislative findings, the court
found that Lucas had conceded that the beach area of the state's
shores was a valuable public resource, that new construction would
contribute to the erosion and destruction of that public resource,
and that discouraging new construction in the area was necessary to
prevent a great public harm.116 Lucas argued that regardless of the
regulatory purpose of preventing serious public harm, if the regulation deprived him "of 'all economically viable use' of his property,"
a taking has occurred for which he must be compensated. 117 The
court did not agree with Lucas.
In its legal analysis, the South Carolina Supreme Court began
by noting that the "United States Supreme Court has never articulated a set formula to determine where regulation ends and takings
begin." 118 Therefore, the Supreme Court weighs several factors to
§ 48-39-250 (Law Co-op Supp. 1991).
111. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1991),
rev'd, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992).
115. Id. at 896-97.
116. Id. at 898.
117. Id. at 898.
118. Id. at 898 (citing Moore v. Sumter County Council, 387 S.E.2d 455, 457
110. S.C. CODE ANN.

n.2 (1990)).
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decide "takings" claims on a "case by case basis."'1 9 The court went
on to clearly state that "a taking has not been found when the regulation exists to prevent serious public harm.' 120 In support of that
contention, the court cited several Supreme Court cases, including
Mugler v. Kansas,12 1 a 1887 case upholding the prohibition of the
manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors. To support its holding
that no taking of Lucas's land had occurred, the court relied on the
United States Supreme Court decision in Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,122 which stated in a footnote that "since
no individual has a right to use his property so as to create a nuisance or otherwise harm others, the State has not 'taken' anything
1 23
when it asserts its power to enjoin the nuisance-like activity."'
Keystone was also cited for the proposition that "prohibition simply
upon the use of property for purposes that are declared, by valid
legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the
1 24
community, cannot in any just sense, be deemed a taking."'
Under this reasoning, the South Carolina Supreme Court did not
even have to consider the economic impact of the regulation on the
economic viability of Lucas's land. Since the legislation's purpose
was to prevent serious public injury, and since Lucas did not challenge the legislative findings that regulation of the coastal dune
area was necessary, no taking could be found. The South Carolina
Supreme Court was certain of its interpretation of the United
States Supreme Court decisions on regulatory takings claims in nuisance and public harm cases: "[Tihe fact remains that the Supreme
Court has time and again held that when a State merely regulates
use, there is no 'taking' for which compensation is due."' 125 However, the South Carolina Supreme Court should not have been so
sure of the United States Supreme Court.
From the initial paragraph of its decision, the United States
Supreme Court focused not on the legislation's purpose of preventing public harm, but on the economic impact of the regulation on
Lucas's oceanfront lots. The Court first noted that the trial court
119. Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 898.
120. Id. at 899.
121. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). The Court also cited Hadachek v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), upholding an ordinance prohibiting the manufac-

ture of bricks near residents in Los Angeles, and Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369
U.S. 590 (1962), upholding the prohibition against excavating below the water
table to extract gravel. See Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 898.
122. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987)

(petitioners failed to show that the relevant statutory provisions constituted a
taking of private property without compensation).
123. Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 899 (quoting Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 n.20 (1987)).
124. Id. at 900 (quoting Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480
U.S. 470, 490 (1987)).
125. Id. at 900.
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found that the Beachfront Management Act rendered the lots "valueless.' 126 Even when phrasing the issue, the Court emphasized
the economic impact factor: "This case requires us to decide
whether the Act's dramatic effect on the economic value of Lucas's
lots accomplished a taking of private property under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments requiring the payment of 'just
compensation.' "127
The United States Supreme Court did agree that it had not determined any "set formula" for determining whether a taking has
occurred. 128 The Court, however, described two categories of regulatory action which are categorically compensable without a casespecific inquiry into the state interest in the regulation. The first
situation in which the Court categorically finds a taking encom129
passes regulations that effect a permanent physical invasion.
Compensation is required for a taking in those cases no matter how
small the intrusion or how lofty the state interest. 130 The other
situation of categorical treatment is "where regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land. '131 Lucas's situation fell squarely into the second category when the Supreme Court
accepted the trial court's finding that the South Carolina prohibition against building left Lucas's land valueless.
Justice Scalia, who delivered the Court's opinion, admitted that
1 32
the Court "had never set forth the justification for this rule."'
Looking to Justice Brennan's suggestion in his dissent in San Diego
Gas & Electric v. San Diego, Scalia equated the total deprivation of
beneficial use to physical appropriation. 3 3 To further support categorically requiring compensation in cases where regulatory action
deprives a landowner of all economic use of his land, the Court relied on "the fact" that such regulations "carry with them a heightened risk that private property is being pressed into some form of
1 34
public service under the guise of mitigating serious public harm."'
126. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2889 (1992).
127. Id. (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 2893.
129. Id. (citing Loretto v. Telepromter Manhattan CATV Corp., 459 U.S. 419
(1982) (New York law mandating landlords to install cable facilities for tenants
constituted an actual physical intrusion, and thus, was a compensable taking
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments)).
130. Id. at 2893.
131. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893 (citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 225,
260 (1980)).
132. Id. at 2894.
133. Id. (citing San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 652
(1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
134. Id. at 2894-895 (citing Annicelli v. Town of South Kingstown, 463 A.2d
133, 140-41 (R.I. 1983)).

1992)

The Constitutional Viability of Inclusionary Zoning

97

In response to the South Carolina Supreme Court's holding
that harmful uses of property may be prohibited by government
regulation without requiring compensation, the Court first recognized that its prior decisions have "suggested" that contention. 135
However, the Court contended that the "harmful use" principle
was only the Court's early attempt to justify, in theoretical terms,
regulatory takings, but cannot be used to distinguish regulatory takings that require compensation from regulatory deprivations that
do not require compensation. 136 Instead, where government seeks
to sustain a regulation that deprives land of all economically beneficial use, it can deny compensation to the landowner only if the prohibited uses inhere in the title itself. In other words, the state's
laws of property and nuisance place restrictions upon land ownership. 3 7 The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court, and remanded the decision for a showing by
South Carolina that the state's property and nuisance law prohibit
x38
the use Lucas intended'
Lucas bought the two lots before the Beachfront Management
Act was enacted. The 1977 South Carolina Coastal Zone Management Act was in force at that time. Under that Act, his land was
not in a "critical area" so Lucas did not need state approval to
build. 139 Thus, when Lucas purchased the land, no regulatory restrictions on development inhered in the title itself. For South Carolina, therefore, to prohibit Lucas from developing his parcels
under the 1988 Act without awarding him compensation, the State
would now have to show that such restrictions are in the title because of the background principles of the state's law on nuisance
and property.
The Court did not engage in a factual analysis of the takings
factor emphasized in Nollan that a land use regulation must substantially advance a legitimate state interest. Instead, it concerned
itself with showing that the "harmful or noxious use" analysis was
the progenitor of the "substantially advances legitimate state interest" factor. 140 Thus, government regulation of a use became legitimate not only because of the noxious quality of a prohibited use, but
135. Id. at 2897.
136. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2897-99. Justice Scalia stated that the "harmful use"
analysis is simply a restatement of the requirement that the government's regulation substantially advance a legitimate state interest. Id. at 2897. Further,
Justice Scalia stated that since the difference between a "'harm-preventing'
and a 'benefit-conferring' regulation" is simply in the eye of the beholder, such
a noxious use analysis cannot "serve as a touchstone" to determine if a regulatory taking has occured. Id. at 2897-99.

137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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at
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at

2899-2901.
2902.
2889.
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also, because of a policy of public benefit. According to the Court,
the transition from its focus on "noxious" uses to the contemporary
principle of legitimate state interest was "an easy one, since the distinction between '[a] harm preventing' and [a] 'benefit-conferring'
regulation is often in the eye of the beholder.' 4 ' Because this distinction is difficult, if not impossible, to objectively discern, the
Court concluded that the noxious use logic could not be used as the
basis for distinguishing regulatory takings that require compensation from regulatory deprivations that do not require compensation.
The Court did not engage in any analysis using the Nollan
means/end test, sticking by the categorical rule it had developed
early in the case.
Criticism of the Court's opinion did not have to wait its publication. Justice Blackmun, in his dissent, accused the Court of
"launch[ing] a missile to kill a mouse.' 42 He argued that the Court
had created a new categorical rule and exception which were not
based in "prior case law, common law, or common sense."' 143 Focusing on the purpose of the Act and the state's interest in prohibiting
development of the area, Blackmun declared that the Act should
have been found constitutional if the state legislature was correct
that the prohibition prevented serious harm. 4 4 He pointed out that
the Court had consistently upheld regulations imposed to restrict
significant injury to the public whatever the economic effect on the
owner."45 Blackmun recited facts showing that the area where Lucas's lots were located was notoriously unstable. In about half of
the last forty years, all or a part of his property was either part of
146
the beach or flooded twice daily by the ebb and flow of the tide.
Thus, prohibiting development of such land was necessary to prevent public harm. Like the South Carolina Supreme Court, Blackmun cited Mugler v. Kansas for the proposition that restrictions on
the use of property for purposes of preventing injury to public
health, safety, or welfare cannot be deemed a taking. 47 He found
no support for the categorical rule in any prior decision of the court.
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, agreed with Blackmun that the
Court's justification for its categorical rule was "remarkably
thin."' 48 Stevens wrote that the Court's new rule conflicts with the
141. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2897.
142. Id. at 2904.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 2906.
145. Id. (citing Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Village of Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927);

and Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887)).
146. Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2905.
147. Id. at 2910 (citing Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-79 (1887)).
148. Id. at 2917.
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Court's frequent recognition that the definition of taking cannot be
reduced to a "set formula" and requires a case-by-case analysis that
balances public and private interest. He pointed out that the Court
had "frequently - and recently - held that in some circumstances a
law that renders property valueless may nonetheless constitute a
taking."' 49 According to Stevens, a comparison of values is relevant
but not conclusive.
D. Analysis of Inclusionary Zoning Under the Tests
in Nollan and Lucas
The Lucas decision could force courts to scrutinize more closely
the economic impact of regulations. Although the Lucas decision
will most immediately impact environmental regulations, particularly in the area of coastal zone management, the Court's emphasis
on the economic viability of the use of land could effect all types of
regulatory taking cases, even those where the owner is not denied
all productive use of the land.
For one thing, the categorical rule appears to lessen the weight
of the state's legitimate interest in the takings equation even when
the regulation does not deprive the landowner of all economically
viable use. The balance between public and private interest in takings decisions has apparently shifted to the private interest. Under
the Lucas rule, takings claims must first begin with an examination
of the economic impact of the regulatory action before the state can
even show its legitimate interest in regulating.
Furthermore, the Court did not offer any guidelines as to when
a regulation has denied an owner's land of all economically beneficial use. For example, Lucas's lots were declared valueless by the
trial court, but Blackmun pointed out that the land could have been
put to "other uses," like fishing and camping, or could have been
sold to neighboring landowners as a buffer.'5 0 This example raises
the issue of from whose perspective will denial of all beneficial use
be determined. If a state makes a showing that the land has economic uses other than development, then possibly the land is not
"valueless." On the other hand, the decision appears to associate
"valueless" with the lack of development. 15' The Lucas decision
should impress upon local land use officials the importance of designing inclusionary zoning programs not only to ensure that landowners are not denied the economically viable use of their land,
which should pose no problem since residential development is not
being prohibited, but also to insure that developers receive a rea149. Id. at 2919.
150. Id. at 2917.
151. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2917.
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sonable profit on the moderately priced dwelling units. A court
may be more inclined to hold that a landowner has suffered a taking where a developer cannot build because constructing moderately priced units would not enable him to recover his costs or
receive reasonable profits on his land.
One way that has been used to guarantee developers a reasonable profit is to use density bonuses. Density bonuses entitle the
developer to build more dwelling units on a given parcel than usually allowed. The higher density should compensate for the building of lower-priced units. However, developers may be reluctant to
take advantage of them to avoid the appearance of an overbuilt project. Developers' production costs may also be cut by fast track
processing of development permits, and granting concessions for
such requirements as minimum floor area, room and lot size, setback lines, building heights, open space, parking spaces, and various
amenities.
Another way to avoid a severe negative economic impact on developers is to set sales prices and rental limits to cover costs of construction. Furthermore, the sales prices and rental limits should be
consistently reviewed and revised to reflect the changes in construction costs.
The Lucas decison may not be interpreted so broadly as to effect situations other than regulatory actions prohibiting all development for purposes of preventing public harm. However, the Court
has once again unsettled the area of land use law and has now focused the regulatory takings determination on the economic impact
of the regulation. But the Nollan nexus factor remains.
A clear nexus must exist between the state interest and the
government action. The regulation or other government action
must substantially advance a legitimate state interest. The degree
to which the state action "substantially" advances the government
interest depends upon the magnitude of the state interest. Thus,
the greater the state interest, the less the government's action will
be scrutinized. This approach invites courts to scrutinize the purpose of the government action. The Supreme Court in Nollan
stated that it had "not elaborated on the standards for determining
what constitutes a 'legitimate state interest,' " but it listed three
governmental purposes and regulations that satisfied the two-prong
Penn Central test - scenic zoning, landmark preservation, and resi152
dential zoning.
152. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834-35 (1987) (citing
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 477 U.S. 225 (1980)(allowing scenic zoning); Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)(supporting landmark
preservation); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)(allowing residential zoning)).
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When litigating the Nollan case, the California Coastal Commission set forth three permissible purposes of government regulations satisfying the two-prong test of the taking analysis: protecting
"the public's ability to see the beach, assisting the public in overcoming the 'psychological barrier' to using the beach created by a
developed shorefront, and preventing congestion on the public
beaches.' x5 3 These are laudable goals of government action, but
one wonders whether the Supreme Court, in finding the permit
condition of an easement invalid as a taking, was concerned about
the legitimacy of viewing a beach as a state interest, especially considering the intrusiveness of the government regulation. The Court
did not focus on this issue, but its almost summary disposition of the
means used to achieve that end can lead to the inference that the
Court was not particularly impressed with the Commission's goal.
If the Commission's goal had been of greater societal importance,
the Court may not have searched for such a tight fit between the
condition and the burden, for such a "substantial" advancement of a
"legitimate" state interest.
Thus, for an inclusionary zoning program to meet the Nollan
test, the municipality implementing the program should articulate
a state interest of paramount importance to society. It should then
design the program to specifically address the state's concern, even
going so far as to conduct surveys and gather statistical evidence to
prove the nexus. In other words, the connection between the regulation, or other government action, and the state interest must be
close. Providing affordable housing'to moderate- and low-income
residents is a legitimate state interest. Inclusionary housing programs clearly do substantially and directly advance that legitimate
state interest.
To show that providing affordable housing is a legitimate state
interest, the municipality need look no further than the programs
and policies of the federal government. The nation has had a housing policy for over fifty years. Since the United States Housing Act
of 1937,154 the federal government has provided housing assistance
to low-income persons. Section 23 of that Act stated that public
housing agencies were to provide low-rent housing which "will aid
1 55
in assuring a decent place to live for every citizen."'
The United States has a declared housing policy:
It is the policy of the United States to promote the general welfare of
the Nation by employing its funds and credits ... to assist the several
States and their political subdivisions to remedy the unsafe and unsanitary housing conditions and the acute shortage of decent, safe, and sanU.S. at 835.
154. 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1988).
155. 42 U.S.C. § 1423 (1988).
153. Nollan, 483
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156

Although this policy has been carried out through a variety of programs and with a varying degree of emphasis by different administrations, it remains the policy. President George Bush even spoke
briefly of the housing problems in his State of the Union address on
January 28, 1992, when he requested that Congress fund his Homeownership and Opportunity for People Everywhere ("HOPE") initiative. These programs, even if inspired by election year politics,
continue to support the idea that providing affordable housing is a
legitimate government function. Even a cursory examination of
federal programs indicates that providing affordable housing is a legitimate state interest. Jack Kemp, current Secretary for the
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development
("HUD"), in the 1989 Annual Report of HUD to Congress, states
that one of the six priorities for HUD was to "[e]xpand homeownership and affordable housing opportunities. '157 One of the stated
purposes of the President's HOPE initiative is to increase homeownership opportunities for low- and moderate-income families. 158
The major provisions of HOPE call for assistance to help tenants in
public housing to become owners of their units, renewal of a tax
credit for development of new affordable rental units, and funds for
fifty "Housing Opportunity Zones" targeting those communities
that best remove tax and regulatory barriers to affordable
159
housing.
Localities have made the provision of affordable housing their
policy. For example, in implementing its MPDU Program, Montgomery County Council made several legislative findings with respect to the supply of housing for low- and moderate-income
residents. For one, it found that public policies which permit exclusively high-priced housing development produce the undesirable
and unacceptable efforts of exclusionary zoning, thus failing to implement the County's housing policy. 1 60

To that end, the Council

declared that the policy of the county would be to provide for lowand moderate-income housing to meet existing and anticipated future employment needs in the county. 161 It also made it the policy
to provide a full range of housing choices for all incomes. 162 The
county showed a legitimate interest in providing housing for its residents by linking the inadequate supply of housing to overused
roads, pollution, and other problems of large scale commuting from
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1988).
1989 HUD ANN. REP. Vi.
Id. at 1.
Id.
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE ch. 25A-1(6) (1988).
Ch.25A-2(2).
Ch.25A-2(1).
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outside the county, to discrimination, and to personnel turnover in
business. Providing affordable housing is a legitimate state interest
since it impacts the health, safety, and welfare of the county
residents.
Under the national housing policy of providing affordable housing, initial reliance was placed on direct government action, carried
out by State-chartered, local public housing authorities, which built,
owned, and operated public housing projects. 16 3 In the 1960's, the
national housing policy shifted to using the private sector for production of subsidized housing, especially for moderate-income families. 164 However, by the end of the 1980's, budget cuts and program
changes led to a drop in the number of families receiving assistance.
State and local government initiatives have to be created to provide
for affordable housing to fulfill the nation's policy of housing its
low- and moderate-income citizens.
Montgomery County's inclusionary housing program is
designed to advance the legitimate state interest of providing affordable housing. The program is designed to provide housing units
that are within the price range of its moderate-income residents, a
category determined by statistical studies. Many restrictions are
placed on program participants to ensure that the units are rented
or bought by those residents. Montgomery County is merely stepping in where the federal government has stepped out.
The inclusionary zoning program can be demonstrated to substantially advance the state's legitimate interest in providing affordable housing. Such programs directly lead to the construction of
homes with prices within the income of low- and moderate-income
residents. The Supreme Court in Nollan stated that "[i]t is quite
impossible to understand how a requirement that people already on
the public beaches be able to walk across the Nollans' property
reduces any obstacles to viewing the beach created by the new
house.' 1 65 The same cannot be said of inclusionary zoning programs that require developers to construct a certain percentage of
units in a development to be affordable to a segment of the population earning moderate incomes. The relationship is direct. As previously stated, the Montgomery County initiative has led to the
construction of 8000 units, and the Mount Laurel decision has led to
the construction of about 22,000 units.
With the Lucas and Nollan decisions in the background, state
and local officials must ensure that the inclusionary programs do
not severely impact the economic viability of the land and that the
163. Housing: Low- and Moderate-Income Assistance Programs, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE (CRS)(Library of Congress May 2, 1991).

164. Id. at 2.
165. Nollan v. California Coastal Council, 483 U.S. 825, 838 (1987).
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programs substantially advance a legitimate state interest, showing
a tight nexus between the means and the end.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The crisis of affordable housing is the problem of the 1990's.
Not only is homelessness on the increase, but middle- and low-income workers are increasingly finding it difficult to find affordable
housing near their jobs, if they find any at all. Exclusionary zoning
practices are part of the problem. Years of economic segregation of
neighborhoods by zoning regulations, as well as unfounded fears
and prejudices, have restricted the construction of affordable housing units such as multi-family dwellings and accessory apartments.
Affirmative action on the part of state and local governments can
begin to relieve the crisis, especially as the federal government exits
the housing construction business. Inclusionary programs are a beginning. Zoning for moderate- and low-income dwellings and mandating a regional fair-share of such housing may result in an
increase in the number of affordable homes to those who teach,
fight fires, and sweep floors. However, the obstacle to such
problems may not be constitutional. It is more likely that the "not
in may back yard" syndrome, as expressed by residents and their
political leaders, poses the greatest obstacle to affordable housing.

